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United Nations meetings in recent years have been characterized
by an oscillation in the relationship between industrial and develop-
ing countries with regard to issues concerning transnational enter-
prises and international investment. At times the atmosphere has
seemed clouded with recriminations, suspicion and mutual misun-
derstanding. For brief periods the tension has been lightened by
agreement on what appear to be common goals and aspirations.
However, such high points are often followed by a descent into
continuing controversy.
In the antitrust field, an apex of unanimity was the resolution
adopted by the Seventh Special Session stating that: "Restrictive
business practices adversely affecting international trade, particu-
larly that of developing countries, should be eliminated and effort
should be made at the national and international levels with the
objective of negotiating a set of equitable principles and rules."'
Consensus on this goal provided the momentum for a more detailed
resolution at the Nairobi UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development) calling for work by a group of experts on
a four point agenda dealing with the elimination of restrictive busi-
ness practices!
The work of this expert group has begun and will be continued
in the spring. A little progress has been made, but very substantial
areas of disagreement and divergence remain. The "Northern" and
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"Southern" nations are far apart on issues such as whether princi-
ples should be binding or voluntary, whether there should be special
exemptions for cartels originating in developing countries and
whether foreign enterprises may be treated differently than domes-
tic ones. This paper, however, will deal primarily with what may
appear to be a more limited and technical issue, but one that is
really quite fundamental in the current U.N. scene. That issue is
how a set of international antitrust principles should deal with re-
strictive arrangements between a foreign parent corporation and its
local subsidiary, particularly where that subsidiary is in a develop-
ing country.
The question of parent-subsidiary relationships is a complex and
debatable one even under well settled and relatively conservative
bodies of antitrust law such as those of the United States and of the
European Economic Community (EEC).
Under American law, it is relatively clear that an antitrust con-
spiracy may not be based upon an alleged agreement between a
corporation and its officers or branches.' After that, clarity is scarce.
On the one hand, there is a substantial body of law to the effect that
the free business choice to set up two separate corporate legal enti-
ties entitles persons who deal with those entities and government
regulators to treat each entity as an independent corporation and
to subject transactions or agreements among such entities to the
strict prohibitions contained in the antitrust laws. In major anti-
trust opinions from Yellow Cab4 through Kiefer-Stewart5 to Perma
Life,6 the Supreme Court has ruled that arrangements between affil-
iated corporations are subject to section 1 of the Sherman Act,7
particularly if parent and subsidiary cooperate to injure competitors
or hold themselves out to the public as separate competing firms.
In Perma Life the Court stated this rule very broadly as follows:
"[Slince respondents . . .availed themselves of the privilege of
doing business through separate corporations, the fact of common
ownership could not save them from any of the obligations that the
3 See, e.g., Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1969); Zelinger
v. Uvalde Rock Asphalt Co., 316 F.2d 47 (10th Cir. 1963); Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v.
Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953); United States
v. Memphis Retail Package Stores Ass'n, 334 F. Supp. 686 (W.D. Tenn. 1971); Schoenberg
Farms, Inc. v. Denver Milk Producers, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 266 (D. Colo. 1964).
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
Keifer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
7 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
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law imposes on separate entities."'
However, in a number of lower court decisions, judges have re-
fused to find illegal conspiracies based on the simple allegation that
a parent and wholly-owned subsidiary agreed to fire one distributor
and hire another,' or agreed to use the same price list.'0 Also, in the
1962 Sunkist case," the Supreme Court dealt more leniently with
the question whether antitrust liability could be premised upon a
price and market allocation agreement among three interrelated but
separately incorporated farmers' cooperative organizations. The
Court held that there was no unlawful conspiracy. Its reasoning was
that:
To hold otherwise would be to impose grave legal consequences
upon organizational distinctions that are of de minimis meaning
and effect . . . .There is no indication that the use of separate
corporations had economic significance in itself or that outsiders
considered and dealt with the three entities as independent organi-
zations.'2
In the more recent C & S Bank case, the Supreme Court stated,
"[tihe central message of the Sherman Act is that a business entity
must find new customers and higher profits through internal expan-
sion-that is, by competing successfully rather than by arranging
treaties with its competitors."' 3 While noting that "this Court has
held that even commonly owned firms must compete against each
other, if they hold themselves out as distinct entities,"' 4 the Court
pointed out "the total lack of realism in suggesting that C&S might
have founded new banks that would have competed vigorously with
it and with each other . . . .' Relying on this reasoning, the opin-
ion then holds that, in light of state legislation preventing C&S from
expanding into new territories by direct internal growth, "C&S's
program of founding new de facto branches, and maintaining them
as such, did not infringe §1 of the Sherman Act."'"
392 U.S. at 141-42.
Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954);
Alpha Distributing Co. v. Jack Daniel's Distillery, 207 F. Supp. 136, 137-38 (N.D. Cal. 1961),
aff'd, 304 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1962).
," United States v. Arkansas Fuel Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. 69, 619 at 76,496 (N.D. Okla.
1960).
Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prod. Co., 370 U.S. 19 (1962).
I? Id. at 29.
" United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 116 (1975).
' Id. at 116.
" Id. at 119.
' Id. at 120.
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The enforcement policy of American antitrust agencies has con-
sistently been to refrain from challenging arrangements between
closely affiliated firms except in special circumstances, notably
when affiliation eliminates actual or potential competition with a
preexisting competitive firm or when agreements between affiliated
firms are employed to engage in predatory practices and entrench a
monopoly position.
On January 26, 1977, the Justice Department issued an Antitrust
Guide for International Operations,'7 consisting of a set of example
cases followed by analyses indicating the Antitrust Division's policy
in regard to important issues of international antitrust enforcement.
The first example case dealt with a major multinational corporation
organized into separate national subsidiaries which referred busi-
ness to each other on the basis of assigned territories. In regard to
this fact situation, the Antitrust Guide states:
The Department of Justice has consistently accepted the view
stated in the 1955 Report of the Attorney General's National Com-
mittee to Study the Antitrust Laws: a parent corporation may
allocate territories or set prices for the subsidiaries that it fully
controls. The Department's test has generally been formulated in
terms of whether the parent controls a majority of the voting stock
of the subsidiary. However, the same reasoning may apply to a
minority position where the U.S. firm maintains effective working
control.
Where majority stock control is not present, the Department
may make a careful inquiry into the facts of the particular case.",
Under Common Market law, the general rule appears to be that
stated by the Court of Justice in the Sterling Drug- Centrafarm case,
that article 85 of the Treaty of Rome 9 is not violated by
[algreements or concerted practices between undertakings be-
longing to the same group in the form of parent company and
subsidiary, if the undertakings form an economic unit within
which the subsidiary does not have real autonomy in determining
its line of conduct on the market and if the agreements or practices
" U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1977).
' Id. at 12-13.
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done Mar. 25, 1957, in OFFICE
FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EURO-




have the aim of establishing an internal distribution of tasks be-
tween the undertakings. 0
On the other hand, the EEC Commission has ruled in the Kodak'
case that identical conditions of sale applied on subsidiaries by the
parent company could be considered as agreements between enter-
prises and made subject to the rules governing contracts which tend
to isolate national markets or maintain price disparities between
Member states."
This ambivalence in Western antitrust treatment of the intracor-
porate arrangements is reflected in the one international declaration
on this subject, which is the second of the competition guidelines
promulgated by the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development) in June 1976. That guideline states that enter-
prises should "allow purchasers, distributors and licensees freedom
to resell, export, purchase and develop their operations consistent
with law, trade conditions, the need for specialisation and sound
commercial practice .... ,,23 The guideline is silent regarding
whether it applies to distributors, purchasers or licensees which are
affiliated with the seller or licensor. The more natural reading is
that such affiliated firms are subject to the guideline. It should be
noted, however, that this provision is not worded as a traditional
antitrust prohibition, but rather in the form of affirmative encour-
agement. It is thus arguable that Western negotiators were prepared
to go somewhat beyond well settled law when they were confident
that what they were writing was a voluntary guideline reflecting
competition policy and trade policy rather than a rule of prohibition
which might well become binding internationally or by adoption as
national law. Such confidence would obviously be misplaced in the
United Nations context where developing countries have empha-
sized their desire for a legally binding code and their wish that, at
the very least, the principles and rules adopted should provide a
basis for legislation in developing countries. 24
The most striking fact about the developing country position at
Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug, Inc., [1974] COMM. MKT. L. R. 480.
2, Re Kodak, [1970] COMM. MKT. L. R. R.P. Supp. D 19.
21 Id.
21 OECD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTI-NATIONAL ENTERPRISES 15 (1976). For
background of OECD developments in antitrust and analysis of the content of the OECD
text, see Joelson, The Proposed International Codes of Conduct as Related to Restrictive
Business Practices, 8 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 837, 848-52, 861-69 (1976).
24 See generally Roffe, International Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology, 11 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 186 (1977).
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UNCTAD is that these nations see intracorporate restrictions not as
a minor technical issue of antitrust policy but as the most important
group of restrictive practices which they wish to have eliminated.
This is for many reasons. These nations recognize that international
cartels among private firms are much rarer than in the 1930's. Sec-
ondly, developing countries are reluctant to support broadly worded
condemnations of cartels for fear of casting aspersions on their own
raw material cartels. Thirdly, their own experience has been that
many of the largest firms manufacturing or selling on a substantial
basis in their territory are subsidiaries of multinational enterprises.
Therefore, to them, how to deal with the power and practices of such
subsidiaries is the central question in the restrictive practice area.
Lastly, the developing countries, hungry for trade and foreign ex-
change earnings, take the American phrase "restraint of trade"
quite literally. They would use it to justify an approach in which the
acceptability of any business practice should be judged in terms of
whether it restricts or restrains their export trade or the opportunity
for enterprises incorporated in their country to purchase on the most
favorable terms possible. They are unconvinced by the contention
that restraint of trade has always meant restraint of competition or
that "restrictive business practices" has always referred to restric-
tions on competition. This difference in approach can be summa-
rized in another way. Delegates from nations with a long antitrust
tradition have tended to argue that the international goal should be
to assure that traditional restrictive business practices do not ham-
per international trade or the trade and development of developing
countries. The developing countries have argued that any practice
which has the effect of limiting their trade or development should
be condemned as a restrictive business practice.
My personal view is that this issue cannot and should not be
resolved solely in terms of legal precedent or conceptual analysis. As
Justice Holmes taught us, the life of the law has been guided less
by abstract logic than by experience and the felt necessities of the
time. 5 One such necessity is the desire of developing countries that
enterprises organized in their countries obey their law and further
their trade interests, regardless of the subsidiary status of some of
these companies. It is thus an inescapable reality that corporate
subsidiaries will have to adjust their economic conduct so as to be
viewed as assets to the host country, regardless of what is negotiated
25 See O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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in an international code for multinational enterprises. But the other
crucial reality, which Western delegates will undoubtedly stress, ,is
that foreign investment and the creation of new, potentially com-
petitive entities are voluntary decisions which enterprises will un-
dertake only if, in light of the perceived rules and circumstances,
the benefits of such decisions outweigh the detriments and risks.
Put more simply, the most relevant policy question appears to be
whether multinational enterprises would be significantly deterred
from creating and improving foreign subsidiaries if they were faced
with rules denying them control of the buying and selling policies
of such subsidiaries. A quantitative answer to such a question seems
highly unlikely. Nevertheless, the consequences of a decline in inter-
national investment activity would be so serious for the world econ-
omy that both developed and developing countries must consider
very carefully before imposing radically different rules of the game
on multinational enterprises.
It should be noted that restrictions on competition between sub-
sidiaries may well be more in the interest of host countries than of
the multinational which may have agreed to such a scheme because
of local demands. New foreign subsidiaries are in a sense "infant
industries," development of which may require at least temporary
protection against outside competition from the same product or
brand.
This analysis suggests that intracorporate restrictions should be
treated at the international level, not as never being a restrictive
business practice or always being a restrictive business practice, but
in terms of the rule-of-reason analysis developed in United States
cases in regard to vertical or distribution restraints, which analysis
is closely approximated by the Common Market treatment of simi-
lar practices."6 Under such an analysis, it would be necessary to
examine the market power of the multinational in the relevant mar-
kets, the degree of independence of the subsidiary, the purpose of
the restraint and the relationship between the scope and duration
of the restraint and any legitimate purposes for it. Moreover, even
carefully qualified rules against restrictions on subsidiaries should
deal only with basically commercial decisions such as sales, resales
and purchases. Investment-related decisions, such as what the sub-
sidiary should manufacture, where it should be located, and how it
2 See Davidow, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law in a Changing World,
8 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 895 (1976).
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should be managed, should be dealt with outside of the interna-
tional restrictive business practice context. Such an approach would
not guarantee carte blanche for the multinational to impose and
maintain all the restrictions it wishes on all types of subsidaries, but
it is clear that developing countries would not tolerate such a situa-
tion in any event.
Certainly, a major reason for participating in the drafting of inter-
national principles and rules is the belief that our involvement will
cause the final product to be more reasonable, more sophisticated
and more pro-competitive than would be the case if the rules were
written entirely by nations with little previous experience in anti-
trust enforcement and the fostering of a free market economy. For
reasons such as this we are participating in this exercise. It may well
be that in doing so, we will learn, as well as teach, more about
enigmatic subjects such as intra-enterprise agreements.
